There are three types of JDP women: the Islamist women, who played a role in the past of the JDP and who had been mobilized personally by Erdogan; the women who work in the party organization and who can be found across a wide spectrum of society from Islamist to liberal groups; and the women members of Parliament representing the center-right. The common characteristic of these women is that in spite of being conservative (different from the definition of conservative in the West), they are not prejudiced against but rather have sensitivity toward Islamic values.When all the three types of women and the practices of Emine Erdogan are examined, one can argue that the JDP women have an identity that minimizes the social distance between women wearing scarves and the women with modern dress. In that respect, the modernization of the "conservative" and the increased Islamic sensitivity of the "modern" reveals a criss-crossing relationship between the two. The JDP can be said to be the party that has extensively dealt with women's issues more than any other political party in the last fifty years.
The triple issues of the headscarf, the public sphere, and secularism are the three obstacles to the JDP's gender policies. The tension between the JDP and other state institutions manifests itself as opposing definitions of turban-public sphere and the principles of secularism. The source of this tension, which will go down in history as the "reception crisis," is the symbolic clash between "secular" and "nonsecular." The national headscarf problem has become a global issue during the JDP government. The headscarf case in the ECHR, which has ended in favor of the secular establishment of Turkey, has especially jolted the expectations the Islamists had of European freedoms. This issue has become an indicator of the departure of the JDP from a religiously-centered party. In conclusion, the JDP, which has been a transformation party in the European Union membership period, has undertaken the transformation of the cultural gender politics of women into a political gender politics.
The major political Islamist movement in Turkey until the late 1990S was the Milli Gorii (National Outlook) movement initiated by Necmettin Erbakan. Despite their Islamist rhetoric, Erbakan and his followers generally avoided direct criticism of secularism. They founded the National Order Party in 1970 and the National Salvation Party in 1972. Both parties were accused of being antisecular and disbanded following the military coup d' etats of 1971 and 1980. In 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party (WP). In the 1995 national elections, the WP received 21.4 percent of the votes and became the leading party. Following the "soft" military coup d' etat on February 28, 1997, the WP was dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court.
The Turkish Armed Forces
In their military academies and staff colleges, Turkish officers are tau they have a sacred duty to defend not only the territory and popu tion of the Turkish Republic but the precepts and principles of Atatur ideological legacy of Kemalism. For the TGS, Kemalism is not an id logical coloring painted onto the Turkish state; it is its essence. Secu ism was not only the driving force behind Ataturk's domestic reforms the I920S and 1930S that laid the foundations for the Kemalist state
vas also the most controversial, triggering violent protests and even rebelions} The bloodshed resulted not only in a hardening of attitudes toward mtisecularists in the Kemalist government of the time but in the creation lf a martyrology.4 It also reinforced a perception in the military of secuarism as a security issue, with the TGS as its main protector.Perhaps more insidiously, the violence of the opposition to Ataturk's ecularizing reforms has resulted in a tendency in the Kemalist establishnent to see secularism not merely as the removal of explicit references o religion in the state sphere-most critically, of course, refusing to use he Qur'an or the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed as a source for legslation-but also as state control of religion in the private sphere.
Kemalism is embedded in the Turkish Constitution. The preamble o the constitution states that it has been formulated in line with the concept of nationalism outlined and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk, the immortal eader and the unrivaled hero.
Article 2 of the constitution states that "[ t] he Republic of Turkey is . democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearng in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based III the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble." Article 4 of the Constitution says that "the provisions in article 2 on the characteristics If the Republic ... shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be oposed."
The most detailed statement of the legal role and obligations of the nilitary is contained in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law January 1961. Article 35 states, "The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces s to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution."
The day after the November 2, 2002 elections that brought the JDP to power, Ozkok announced that the military accepted the results of the ballot as representing the "will of the people." Nevertheless, on November IO, 2002, in the first written statement issued by the TGS to mark the anniversary of Atatiirk's death in 1938, Ozkok vowed that the Turkish military would continue to "protect the Republic against every kind of threat, particularly fundamentalism and separatism." However, privately he told colleagues that, regardless of any other considerations, the TGS could not move against the JDP unless it actually attempted to violate secularism or indicated its intention to do so. Yet the first tensions occurred not between the ]DP and the TGS but between the new government and President Sezer.
Under article 76 of the Turkish Constitution, Erdogan's 1998 conviction meant that he was barred from holding public office. He was unable to stand as a candidate in the November 2002 elections and had to wait until the new]DP administration was able to amend the Turkish Constitution to lift his ban, finally entering Parliament through a by-election in the southeastern town of Siirt on March 9, 2003.
As a result, the first JDP government was headed by the ]DP's deputy chairman, Abdullah Giil. On November 18, 2002, Giil presented the list of his Cabinet members to President Sezer for official ratification. They included Besir Atalay, a former university rector who had been dismissed for alleged Islamist activism, as education minister. Sezer refused to endorse the nomination, forcing Giil to replace Atalay with Erkan Mumcu, who was widely regarded as a moderate. However, when it was suspected that the ]DP was attempting to breach the headscarf ban, it was the military that responded.
On November 20, 2002, Sezer and his wife left Turkey to attend a NATO summit in Prague. Under Turkish protocol, while the president is out of the country his ceremonial responsibilities pass to the Speaker of Parliament. Sezer and his wife were seen off at the airport in Ankara by the new JDP Speaker of Parliament, Biilent Army, accompanied by his own wife, who, like the majority of the wives of the JDP leadership, wears a headscarf. Although Army denied he had been deliberately provocative, to the Kemalist establishment the participation of a woman in a headscarf in what was seen as an official ceremony was an assault on secularism. On November 28, Turkey's force commanders, headed by Ozkok, delivered a wordless warning to Army by visiting him in his office in Parliament, where they sat in complete silence for three minutes before leaving. (Newspaper . Milliyet, November 21, 2002.)
Through the 1990’s, the TGS had conducted regular purges of the officer corps, expelling hundreds of officers suspected of Islamist activism or even merely excessive piety. Under current Turkish law, officers dismissed from the military do not have the right of appeal, while military procedures mean that they are often not even allowed to present a defense to the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which hears their cases. After taking office, the JDP further antagonized the TGS by appointing as head of the Parliamentary Defence Committee Ramazan Toprak, a former soldier who had been dismissed from the military in 1997 for alleged Islamist activism. Under pressure from the TGS, Toprak resigned in January 2003. However, military suspicions of the JDP were reinforced on December 27, 2002, when both Giil and Army publicly declared that decisions of the SMC should be eligible for appeal, and received a sharp rebuke from Ozkok, who accused them of encouraging fundamentalists to penetrate and weaken the Turkish armed forces. ("AKP'ye ilk elqtiriler," Radikal, January 9, 2003.)
Yet on the one issue that overshadowed both domestic and international politics during the early months of 2003-namely the impending US-led war to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein-rather than trying to dictate policy, both the JDP government and the TGS appeared to prefer to allow the other to assume responsibility. As early as summer 2002, the TGS had decided that war was inevitable and that Turkey would have no choice but to support the United States, even putting its troops on the ground in northern Iraq, in order both to protect its alliance with Washington and to stifle any Iraqi Kurdish aspirations of independence, which it feared might inspire Turkey's own still restive Kurdish minority. Although the Turkish military remained in regular contact with the war planners in the Pentagon through fall 2002 and into early 2003, it refrained from giving Washington an explicit commitment either to fight alongside US. troops or to allow them to transit Turkey on their way to opening a northern front to supplement the main thrust of the military campaign driving out of the Gulf. This was partly because the TGS was hoping that, by delaying, it could exact better terms for participation-both as regards the deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq and with a view to future military aid from the United States-and partly because any commitment would have to include not only the Turkish military but also the Turkish government.
The election of the JDP complicated the situation still further. The Turkish public was deeply-and increasingly-opposed to war against Iraq. Despite the JDP's claim to be a conservative rather than a religious party, there was also no doubt that, when it came to Iraq, a large proportion of both the JDP parliamentary party and its voters were primarily motivated by feelings of anti-Americanism and Muslim solidarity. Although the JDP leadership was aware that-for reasons of international realpolitik it probably could not afford to remain aloof from the coming conflict, for emotional and domestic political areas namely, the potential electorate fallout from supporting a deeply unpopular war-it would prefer to shift responsibility for participation onto the military. For similar reasons, the TGS was unwilling to pressure the civilian government into making a commitment to participate in the war as this could then be used by the JDP to undermine the Turkish military's domestic prestige; and, given its reluctance to use armed force, the military's public prestige is now the main instrument through which the TGS can exert political leverage. The severing of most of the "back channels" that the TGS had been able to utilize with previous administrations meant that there was now little communication between the government and the military.
In February 2003, as Washington continued to apply pressure for a decision one way or the other as to whether Turkey would allow U.S. troops to transit the country on their way to Iraq, the JDP government decided to put the issue to a vote in Parliament on Saturday March 1. A meeting of the NSC was due to be held on February 28. The JDP appears to have calculated that the TGS would use the NSC meeting to issue a public recommendation to Parliament to pass the motion and allow the government to shift the responsibility for the U.S. troop deployment onto the military. But Ozkok declined to insist on any reference to the motion in the communique issued at the end of the meeting. Outmaneuvered, the JDP was left with no option but to ensure that the motion passed through Parliament. Although he was still not a member of Parliament, on the morning of March I, 2003, Erdogan held an informal poll of JDP MPs. Only a handful indicated that they would oppose the motion. But when it was actually put to Parliament that evening, the motion passed by only 264-250 with 19 abstentions, leaving the government three votes short of the constitutional requirement of a majority of those who participated in the vote.
The result was a humiliation for the government but was greeted with elation by most of the Turkish public, and with angry dismay by Washington. Fearful that another defeat could split the party, the government refused to present another motion to Parliament. The fact that the U.S.-led military campaign to oust Saddam Hussein was completed quicker, and with fewer U.S. casualties, than had been anticipated went some way toward limiting the damage to Turkish-U.S. relations. However, although ties received a boost in October 2003 with the JDP's offer to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq-a proposal that was rejected by the Iraqis-the relationship between Ankara and Washington was nevertheless irrevocably changed by the March 1 decision.
The debacle of March I also came as a shock to the TGS, which feared that it would severely reduce Turkey's ability to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq, either directly through a military presence on the ground or by persuading Washington to rein in the Iraqi Kurds. There were also concerns the fallout could affect Turkish defense procurement from the United States, which remains its largest supplier of weapons and military equipment. Hard-liners inside the TGS openly complained that Ozkok should have been more assertive at the February 28 NSC meeting.
However, when it came to the headscarf ban, neither Ozkok nor President Sezer was willing to allow the JDP any leeway. On April 23, 2003, the TGS boycotted a reception held by Biilent Annci to celebrate National Sovereignty and Children's Day when it learned that it would be co-hosted by his headscarved wife. At the NSC meeting on April 30, 2003, the TGS stepped up the pressure on the government, accusing it of trying to foster links with what it described as "fundamentalist organizations" amongst the Turkish diaspora in Europe. It also ensured that the subsequent statement released to the press led with the declaration that the meeting had stressed the importance of meticulously protecting the principle of secularism which is one of the basic characteristics of the state.A few days later, on May 5, 2003, the TGS issued a press release describing itself as the "fearless guardian of Atatiirk's legacy."
The fall of 2003 also saw a confrontation between the government and the military in arguably the most sensitive area, that of education. Kemalists argued that government plans to reform the higher education system would encourage the growth of preacher-training high schools, known as imam Hatip schools, and make it easier for their graduates to enter university.49 On September 9, 2003, General Aytay Yalman, the commander of the Turkish Land Forces, met with university rectors to discuss opposition to the draft reform bill. Yalman was generally regarded as a hard-liner, and over the previous six months there had been frequent rumors in the Turkish media that some officers had become impatient at what they saw as Ozk6k's passivity. Initial press reports suggested that the meeting with the university rectors had been at Yalman's initiative. On September 14, 2003, the TGS was forced to issue a written statement that the meeting had been a follow-up to one held by Ozk6k on September 1. The TGS statement also dismissed suggestions that education lay outside its field of responsibility, declaring that "[i]t is natural that the developments related to the national education system which is of such vital importance to Turkey should be followed closely and carefully by the Turkish Armed Forces." (Press Statement No. BN-19/03," September 14, 2003.)
Over the following weeks, the TGS continued to apply pressure, both behind the scenes and through statements to the press by leading commanders.The government subsequently postponed trying to push the educational reforms through Parliament. But rumors persisted that some commanders believed that the JDP was drawing strength from Ozk6k's reluctance to confront the government. On December 29, 2003, a leading ]DP MP, Fehmi Hiisrev Kutlu, angrily complained that the portraits in Parliament of Ataturk in military uniform made him feel as if he was imprisoned in a barracks. On December 30, 2003, Yalman issued a furious public condemnation of Kutlu's statement. In an unprecedented break with the military hierarchy, Yalman had acted independently, publicly attacking Kutlu without first clearing what he was going to say with Ozk6k. Unable to punish what was virtually an act of insubordination for fear of weakening the public prestige of the TGS by implying that there were divisions in its ranks, Ozkek was left with little choice but to issue his own statement on December 31, 2003, supporting Yalman and condemning Kutlu. ("Askerden imam hatip muhurasl," Hurriyet, October 14, 2003.)
However, by March 2004 the tensions between Ozk6k and Yalman appeared to have dissipated. On March 3, 2004, Ozkek delivered his most explicit warning to date to the ]DP government when he dispatched Yalman at the head of a delegation of virtually all of the upper echelon of the TGS to attend a conference organized by a Kemalist nongovernmental organization, the Association for Kemalist Thought, or ADD, to mark the eightieth anniversary of Ataturk's abolition of the caliphate. Surrounded by television cameras, the TGS delegation occupied the entire front row in the auditorium and vigorously applauded as a succession of speakers warned of the dangers facing secularism and affirmed their determination to defend it at whatever cost. ("Komutanl1 hilafet paneli," Radikal, March 4, 2004.)
However, in early May 2004, emboldened by its victory in the March local elections, the government decided once again to reform the educational system and make it easier for imam Hatip school graduates to enter university. The full details of the reform package were made public by Education Minister Huseyin Jelik on May 4, 2004. On May 6, the TGS issued a statement describing the reform package as "designed to damage the principles of secular education" and delivered what was, for a government largely composed of former members of the WP, a thinly veiled warning: "The views and attitude of the Turkish Armed Fo,rces toward the Republic's characteristics as a democratic, secular and social state ruled by law are the same today as they were yesterday and shall remain the same tomorrow. No one should have any doubt or misapprehension about the thoughts and attitudes of the Turkish Armed Forces in this regard."( TGS Press Statement no. BN-07/04," May 6, 2004.)
But the government appeared undeterred, even defiant. Prime Minister Erdogan retorted that "[n]o one should try to put pressure on the will of the people. If they do, they will see Parliament's answer. If Parliament represents the people's will, then its decisions should be respected by all." (Turkish Daily News, May 12, 2004.)
In the early hours of May 13, after an eighteen-hour all-night debate, Parliament passed the reform package and submitted it to Sezer for presidential approval. On May 28 Sezer announced that he was vetoing the bill on the grounds that it was incompatible with the constitutional principle of secularism, which he described as "the foundation stone of all the values which comprise the Turkish Republic.” ( Radikal, May 29, 2004.)
In order for the law to come into effect in time for the new academic year, it would have to be passed before Parliament went into summer recess in July.56 But, faced with the combined opposition of the TGS and the presidency, the JDP backed down. On July 3, 2004, Erdogan admitted, ''As a government we are not ready to pay the price."
From this two part study so far, it is clear that international conjuncture strengthens the JDP's position regarding the reforms of domestic politics. The JDP, as a single-party government, also has the advantage of working in harmony to implement the economic stability program and the political reforms necessary for meeting the Copenhagen criteria. It is true that the JDP has taken the lead in consolidating European norms and values in Turkey through the EU legal system. The harmonization packages reduced the military's autonomy by limiting its role in the National Security Council and by putting military expenditures under parliamentary scrutiny, These packages have also allowed broadcasting in Kurdish dialects. Moreover, the JDP government has passed laws on public administration and local governments to restructure public services in accordance with the new public administration techniques. These laws relegate some of the powers of the central government to local administrative entities.
In spite of the reforms in the EU harmonization process, the JDP's performance in managing the opportunity spaces to enlarge freedoms about identity issues should be questioned. One of the most critical challenges for the ]DP leadership is how to handle the domestic tensions over the sensitive and symbolic issues of Turkish secularism (headscarf issue, imam Hatip schools) while shaping foreign policy according to its own outlook. The JDP has so far avoided antagonizing the secularists on these sensitive issues. However, the JDP's consensual style (waiting until a "broad social consensus" is reached) is not success-ful in managing the issues of Islamic demands (headscarf and imam Hatips).
Its new political style has not produced a compromise on the sensitive issues of the Republic either, although the JDP has emphasized that they will seek consensus with the opposition parties and civil society institutions before introducing any major policy. In a very short time, it became obvious that achieving consensus is easier said than done. In spite of the wide consensus of the public on the need for restructuring the system, the government, which is entitled to reform, is under constant suspicion. The burden of this suspicion necessitates smooth management of tensions while pushing reforms in the political system. On the one hand, on several occasions, the military, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the RPP (Republican People's Party), and some elements of civil bureaucracy have underlined their determination to protect the secular nature of the Republic against any Islamist change. Again, the president has often vetoed laws enacted by the JDP-dominated Parliament on the grounds that they violated the secular foundations of the Republic. On the other hand, the JDP is far from meeting the expectations of Islamic conservative circles. The party's hesitant style about the reforms of education and the Council of Higher Education (YOK), and its inertia in solving the problem of headscarves, are interpreted by some Islamist circles as a psychology of being restricted. According to Ahmet Tagetiren, a columnist in the Islamist daily, the JDP government acts as if it is under supervision while being so vulnerable to the accusations of takiyye (hidden intentions). The EU harmonization reforms are exceptions to this but still the negative psychology of JDP power creates a public conviction that it is only possible to reform the system with the help of external dynamics and that the value of the national will is limited in this respect. For the time being, the party is not able to meet Islamic expectations on the issues of religious education and headscarves but at the same time it could bring new definitions to "conservative values" (religiosity and unity of family). The JDP's intention in presenting the bills on YOK and religious education and later their withdrawal seems to be twofold: first to show its Islamist constituency that it is not possible to achieve their demands at this time, and second to reduce resistance to policies that accord legitimacy to religious considerations in public life by putting forth proposals one after another.
The JDP's new politics still have to confront the political tensions regarding headscarves, religious education, and Kurdish cultural rights while transforming the domestic political structure through the EU legal system. Its success in this respect is highly dependent on its ability to facilitate agreement and to prevent excessive conflict and fragmentation over sensitive issues. One may argue that the need for transformation (integration with the EU) forces the JDP to take a post-Kemalist stand. As a reflection of the JDP's both reformist and conservative political agenda, it tries to reach a post- Kemalist stage at which the basic ideals of Kemalism such as Europeanization and secularism would be fultilled through integration with the EU while the Kemalist fears about the divisive effects of identity politics are being calmed down. In the context of the EU accession process and globalization, the primary challenge of the JDP's foreign policy is to redefine the Turkish national identity. In this respect, the JDP has to"enrich its political discourse of conservative democracy to integrate the demands of identity politics (Kurdish and Islamic identities) into the Turkish national identity. Conservative democracy is still a vague concept and it is not theorized yet to meet the demands of identity politics in Turkey.
In the end the current Government in Turkey isn’t really interested in joining the EC. The EU agenda appears to have been shelved on such issues as minority rights, the Kurdish issue and, most contentious of all, Cyprus.
For example today, Cengiz Aktar, Professor of European Studies at Bahcesehir University said: "The government virtually stopped all reforms in December 2004 when it got the green light to start membership talks, and reforms realised before then are not being implemented. We are seeing a rise in nationalist and militarist moods here, and the government - which is already trying to win the next election - has decided to appeal to these nationalist voters. The Cyprus issue is hanging like the sword of Damocles over Turkey's EU accession process. The EU says Ankara must honour its commitment to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic by the end of this year. Turkey refuses unless the EU lifts the isolation of northern Cyprus. The only way to bypass this is to work hard for harmonisation with the EU, so Brussels realises Turkey is serious and it can't call the whole thing off over Cyprus. If Turkey can't do that it may all collapse. Then we will drift away from Europe and the West. That is definitely a possibility."
Also staff at the EU information centre in the heart of European Istanbul say public interest in the accession process has also fallen away in recent months. The drop-in centre, piled high with glossy brochures, now deals with just 20 enquiries on an average day, mostly from students seeking advice on study grants.
As for the deadly explosion near a popular tourist attraction on Turkey's Mediterranean coast June 24 caused by a bomb, not a faulty gas canister as Turkish authorities claim, surveillance video of the scene reportedly shows a man placing a plastic bag in a trash can outside a restaurant at the waterfall, while two other people -- a man and a woman -- appear to act as lookouts. After planting the IED, the three linger at the scene for a few minutes, watching the waterfall, and then depart. The bomb explodes 20 minutes later.
The TAK has been waging a campaign against Turkey's economy since September 2004. As part of that campaign, it has claimed responsibility for a series of small IED attacks at tourist locations on Turkey's Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, as well as in Istanbul.
Over the past year, TAK often has used trash cans to conceal its IEDs. This tactic has been successful for several reasons: Trash cans are found everywhere, especially near public gathering places, such as food courts, shopping areas and tourist attractions. They are perfect for concealing small IEDs and yet few people even notice them unless they need to use one. Also, because of the cans' unsanitary nature and often repugnant odor, people are unlikely to scrutinize their contents. Their relatively small size does limit the amount of explosives that can be concealed -- an IED that fits in a trash can will not bring down an entire building -- but those that do fit can still cause significant damage.
The reluctance on the part of Turkish authorities to call this a militant attack demonstrates their sensitivity toward the country's vital tourism industry. Fewer than 10 days before the blast, a similar IED detonated near a busy bus station used by tourists in Istanbul. After the blast, Turkish authorities asked journalists not to "exaggerate" the incident because it would negatively affect the upcoming tourist season. But Turkish officials are not the only ones concerned about negative publicity from the attacks. Journalists who arrived at the Manavgat waterfall after the explosion reportedly were attacked by local merchants who feared the publicity would hurt their businesses.
Because its aim thus far has been to discourage tourists from visiting Turkey, not to cause mass casualties, the TAK has appeared to be satisfied with using IEDs that fit in trash cans. But tourist reservations for Turkey's southern coast appear to be holding steady, even after the latest bombing. Should this trend continue, the TAK could start using larger, more dangerous bombs. Surveillance video of the scene reportedly shows a man placing a plastic bag in a trash can outside a restaurant at the waterfall, while two other people -- a man and a woman -- appear to act as lookouts. The two lookouts also could have been on hand to prevent anyone from interfering with the operation or to shoot the trio's way out of the area had authorities confronted them. After planting the IED, the three linger at the scene for a few minutes, watching the waterfall, and then depart. The bomb explodes 20 minutes later.
The TAK has been waging a campaign against Turkey's economy since September 2004. As part of that campaign, it has claimed responsibility for a series of small IED attacks at tourist locations on Turkey's Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, as well as in Istanbul.
Over the past year, TAK often has used trash cans to conceal its IEDs. This tactic has been successful for several reasons: Trash cans are found everywhere, especially near public gathering places, such as food courts, shopping areas and tourist attractions. They are perfect for concealing small IEDs and yet few people even notice them unless they need to use one. Also, because of the cans' unsanitary nature and often repugnant odor, people are unlikely to scrutinize their contents. Their relatively small size does limit the amount of explosives that can be concealed -- an IED that fits in a trash can will not bring down an entire building -- but those that do fit can still cause significant damage.
The reluctance on the part of Turkish authorities to call this a militant attack demonstrates their sensitivity toward the country's vital tourism industry. Fewer than 10 days before the blast, a similar IED detonated near a busy bus station used by tourists in Istanbul. After the blast, Turkish authorities asked journalists not to "exaggerate" the incident because it would negatively affect the upcoming tourist season. But Turkish officials are not the only ones concerned about negative publicity from the attacks. Journalists who arrived at the Manavgat waterfall after the explosion reportedly were attacked by local merchants who feared the publicity would hurt their businesses.
Because its aim thus far has been to discourage tourists from visiting Turkey, not to cause mass casualties, the TAK has appeared to be satisfied with using IEDs that fit in trash cans. But tourist reservations for Turkey's southern coast appear to be holding steady, even after the latest bombing. Should this trend continue, the TAK could start using larger, more dangerous bombs.