Daneshyar announced that he has prepared the ground for China to set up 20 nuclear power plants for Iran in the coming years. This was confirmed by the Majlis press department.
The Chinese ambassador also talked about “cooperation” in the construction of an oil refinery, dams, road construction, rail tracks for Tehran’s underground and steel plants, as well as joint investments.
With less fanfare, the Chinese appear to have landed multi-billion dollar transactions to develop Iran’s run-down oil fields, build Caspian Sea terminals and also air ports.
India in turn is nervously eying the construction of the Pakistan port of Gwadar with Chinese assistance.
“Being only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the Straights of Hormuz, Gadwar will enable Pakistan to control the world’s energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers” – said Indian Navy Admiral Suresh Mehta at a recent lecture.
Mehta pointed to Beijing’s strategy, dubbed “String of Pearls”, which plans strategically-located bases and outposts along its energy lines across the globe, to monitor and safeguard energy flows.
“Among other
locations, the string moves northwards up to the deep sea port of Gwadar
on Pakistan’s Makran coast,’ said the admiral. “…A highway is under
construction joining Gwadar with Karachi. This will connect with the Krakoram
Highway, thus providing China with a gateway to the Arabian Sea.”
Historical Background of The China-Pakistan-Iran Axis
During the first visit to China by a top-level Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) leader, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in 1985, the chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (China's parliament), Peng Zhen, noted that both China and Iran "had had similar experiences as victims of imperialism and colonialism and were subjected to hegemonic threat today." (" Iran 's Rafsanjani Meets PRC Leaders, Ends Tour," Xinhua, June 28, 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China, July 1, 1985, I-1.)
Premier Zhao Ziyang and Rafsanjani agreed that China and Iran were both " Third World countries with similar histories" and shared many views on international issues. Rafsanjani noted that both countries had "shared experience of the colonialist scourge," and this convinced him that China would not encroach on the interests of Iran while developing relations with it. (" Iran 's Rafsanjani, Delegation Continue PRC Tour," Xinhua, June 27, 1985, FBIS-CHI, June 28, 1985, I-1. )
When I R I president Seyed Ali Khamenei visited China in 1989, his counterpart People's Republic of China (PRC) president Yang Shangkun stressed that because the two countries shared a "common history" they had common duties in the world today. Both countries had been engaged in a constant struggle against imperialism and had both succeeded in their campaigns, Yang told Khamenei. ("President Khamenei Accorded Warm Welcome in China ," Tehran Times, May 10,1989.)
In the event of a U.S.-PRC military confrontation that became protracted and in which the United States used its naval supremacy to blockade China 's coast, China 's ability to continue prosecution of the war would be influenced by its ability to import vital materials overland. In such a situation it would be extremely useful to have robust and redundant transport links via Pakistan and Iran and to have long-standing, cooperative ties "tested by adversity" with both of those countries.
Iran, along with Pakistan, plays an increasingly important role in providing western China access to the oceanic highway of the global economy. Economic and strategic factors converge here. The striking success of China 's post -1978 development drive was predicated on integrating eastern China into the global economy, and that, in turn, was predicated on the many fine ports on China 's east coast. Those ports offered access to the oceanic highways that carried China-manufactured goods to distant markets. Western China, locked deep in the interior of Eurasia , suffered a distinct disadvantage in this regard. Western, interior provinces, with strong support from Beijing, attempted to mitigate this disadvantage by opening transport links with their neighbors. Yunnan province in China 's southwest achieved considerable success in opening or improving road, riverine, and rail links with and through Myanmar to ports (including several that were China built) on the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar 's location in the southeastern foothills of the Tibetan plateau had for many centuries made it a natural transit route between southwestern China and the Bay of Bengal . Xinjiang was not so fortunate. Its traditional international trade routes were the long and tenuous lines of the various "silk roads" across Central Asia . Beijing attempted to strengthen Xinjiang's transport links with Central Asia.
In 1990 the Soviet Central Asia railway grid was finally linked to that of Xinjiang when a line was opened between Urumqi and Aqtoghay, Kazakhstan. Then in the late 1990s a rail line was pushed south along the western rim of the Tarim Basin, reaching Kashgar by 1999. As of 2005, construction of two trans- Kyrgyzstan highways running westward from Kashgar is under way, with the intention of eventually transforming one of those routes into a rail line The China-supported construction of the rail line from Mashhad to Tedzhen, Turkmenistan, opened in 1996, as noted earlier, was also part of this effort to link Xinjiang to Iranian ports. The map (drawing) below shows these various transport routes.
China 's adoption in 2000 of a program to accelerate development of its western regions made development of transportation lines to the southwest even more important. Pakistan was China 's major partner in this regard. In August 2001 Premier Zhu Rongji committed China to provide $198 million to support the first phase of construction of a new seaport at Gwadar in Pakistan's Baluchistan. (" China Assisted Gwadar Port to Be Completed in Three Years," Karachi Business Recorder, September 16, 2002 ).
Zhu also promised unspecified support for two subsequent phases of the project. When complete, the new Gwadar port was to have a cargo throughput capacity equivalent to Karachi , thereby nearly doubling Pakistan 's maritime capacity and allowing cargoes to circumvent Karachi 's extremely crowded facilities. Also in 2001, China committed $250 million to assist Pakistan in modernizing its railway system.(Nadeem Malik, " China Pledges US$1 Bn Honeypot for Pakistan ," Asia Times, May 15,2001)
In March 2003 Beijing committed an additional $500 million to Pakistan 's railway modernization, including construction of new tracks. ("Finance Advisor Speaks on Jamali's China Visit," Nation, Islamabad, March 24, 2003).
China also agreed to provide financial support for construction of a new rail line northward from Gwadar and linking up at Dalbandin with the existing east-west rail line. China also agreed to finance construction of a highway east from Gwadar along the Makran coast. Simultaneously measures were taken to expedite the flow of truck traffic along the Karakoram Highway running from Kashgar to Rawalpindi in northern Pakistan .
While China 's major transportation investments in southwest Asia have been in Pakistan , Iran has played a role via several railway projects that dovetailed with China 's efforts in Pakistan . The first of these Iranian projects was construction of a rail line between Kerman in southeast Iran and Zahedan on the Iran- Pakistan border. Work on this line was under way in 2002.When complete, this rail line will link the Iranian and Pakistani rail systems for the first time. Work was also under way on a new rail line extending southwest from Mashhad directly across northeastern Iran to Bafq. This line was to be operational by early 2005. The completion of these new lines will mean that Chinese cargo moving via the Tedzhen-Mashhad link can proceed directly to seaports without having to take the long, circuitous, and crowded but previously required detour via Tehran . Once these new lines are open, Chinese cargo will also be able to move between Pakistan and Iran and via ports in either of those two countries. These new lines will add considerable redundancy to China 's southwest Asia transportation system. ("Finance Advisor Speaks on Jamali's China Visit," Nation (Islamabad ), March 24, 2003).
There also have been elements of conflict as well as cooperation in the Sino- Iranian relationship. Throughout the history of post-1971 Sino-Iranian relations there has typically existed an asymmetry in interest in a closer partnership to counter one or another superpower. During the pre-1979 era, it was China that was the more ardent suitor in the SinoIranian relationship, with Beijing pressing Tehran to playa greater role in what Beijing saw as the emerging global united front against Soviet social imperialist expansionism. The shah was reluctant to go down that path. His aim in cooperating with China was deterring and moderating Soviet behavior, not provoking the Soviet Union . China , however, felt a dire threat of encirclement or even direct attack by the Soviet Union, and urgently wanted a global anti-Soviet coalition that would lessen Soviet pressure on China . During the post-1979 period, the situation was reversed. Tehran became the more ardent suitor and Beijing the more hesitant party. Confronted with the deterioration of relations with the United States , the European countries, and its Arab neighbors, Iran needed friends. The end of the Iraq- Iran war freed Moscow from its alliance obligations to Iraq and opened the door to Soviet-Iranian cooperation, but the dissolution of the Soviet state greatly reduced the willingness and ability of Russia to support Iran against the West. In its search for international partners during the 1990S, Tehran propounded joint Iranian-Chinese confrontation of the United States and various sorts of anti-u. S. hegemony blocs to include China , Iran , India , Pakistan, Russia , and even Japan. Beijing was not interested. Tehran responded by criticizing China's close relations with the United States in 1979, during Reagan's 1984 visit, and again when Beijing capitulated to U. S. pressure over nuclear and missile cooperation in 1997. Beijing moved to mollify Iranian criticism but did not alter the course of its underlying U. S. policy.
Beijing has been wary of overly close association with the I R I. The potential financial costs of close association with Iran may have been one Chinese consideration here. A major element of antihegemony, Third World solidarity was to be, Tehran insisted, robust Chinese financial support for development projects in Iran . A key theme of China 's post-1978 foreign policy line was to avoid, with rare exceptions (one of which was the Tehran metro), such costly overseas projects that, Deng Xiaoping felt, had helped impoverish China under Mao Zedong's rule. Iran 's very size meant that as an ally its demand on Chinese resources could be quite heavy.
Political factors were probably more important in explaining the distance Beijing maintained in ties with the IRI. Overly close association with the IRI could hurt China 's international reputation. Deng Xiaoping strove quite effectively to shed China 's revolutionary image acquired during Mao's rule. Close association with revolutionary Iran ran counter to Deng's effort to normalize China 's reputation and diplomacy. After 1978 and with increasing clarity into the 1990s, China desired to be accepted as a responsible power qualified to be admitted by the international community into the ranks of the leading nations of the world. Achievement of this respectability was not facilitated by close association with Islamic revolutionary IRI or by implication in possible IRI nuclear weapons efforts. Close alignment with the IRI could also injure China 's ties both with the Arab countries and with Israel .
There were also numerous smaller frictions in the Sino-Iranian relationship. The propensity of some Iranian foundations, and perhaps even the IRI government, to foster radical Islamic thought in China's Muslim communities and in Central Asian countries contiguous to China generated conflict in the P RC- IRI relation. This conflict led not to estrangement but, paradoxically, to greater emphasis on "friendship." Beijing sought to demonstrate to Tehran that cooperation with China was valuable, but that such cooperation would be impossible ifIranian "interference" in the affairs of China 's Muslim communities continued. In effect, Beijing made cessation of Iranian subversion the price of Chinese friendship and cooperation. Conflict thus led to engagement and friendship, rather than to sanctions and hostility.
Tehran sometimes defaulted on payment of its bills to Beijing . Difficulties of doing business in Iran certainly tested the patience of Chinese businesspeople no less than German, South Korean, Canadian, or Norwegian. Arbitrary and unilateral Iranian changes in agreements sometimes led to Chinese protests. So to did Iranian "discrimination" against Chinese goods in favor of Western technology. Negotiations over business deals were often long and hard, with Iranian calls for Third World solidarity being met with Chinese insistence on mutual benefit.
Conclusion
Today, China is already under contract to buy natural gas from Iran’s huge North Pars fields. And today, the Iranians are pushing ahead eagerly on cooperation with China, partly to show the Russians that, while heavily dependent on their military and economic ties with Moscow, they don’t entirely trust them.
