There will be at least six potential rivals emerging to challenge the United States’ sole ownership of global, real-time, space-based reconnaissance and navigation: Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran and Europe. All six have their own internal limits on what they can and will do as far as space-based technology goes, but each will attempt to deploy such assets one way or another.
Russia is the only competitor with an outside shot of actually reforming its existing space program to the point of creating a near-global, near-real-time reconnaissance system. Add this to existing ballistic missile technology, and a space-capable Moscow would pose a genuine threat to U.S. hegemony. The variable here is the economic and political status of Russia throughout the decade; the country is in a cycle of decline.
India and China are hamstrung by their indigenous space programs’ limitations and the limitations created by economic difficulties, such as those forecast for China. Nevertheless, both countries maintain fairly substantial missile programs they will seek to augment with space-based assets to multiply their missiles’ capabilities and deny the perception of free passage through their territorial waters. A rise in Chinese nationalism/militarism could serve as an impetus for this despite economic and social limitations. India’s economy will continue to grow, and a severe economic crunch will not negatively impact its fledgling space program. It is possible— and probable, in India’s case—that a limited space program, coupled with indigenous and exogenous missile development, could provide checks to U.S. naval dominance on a regional scale.
Japan’s national security interests currently are in line with U.S. global and regional interests. In the long term, however, Japan likely anticipates its interests diverging from Washington’s and could seek to use good relations now to incrementally launch a space-based reconnaissance and navigation program further down the road. This will be done slowly and innocently—dual-use satellites, for example—so as not to raise the United States’ hackles and likely will not be completed by 2015, given Japan’s economic and political limitations.
Iran and Europe are even further behind the power curve than other potential rivals. Europe has demonstrable space-based and satellite capabilities but does not, and likely will not, have the internal structure or political willingness to pursue a militaristic space program—though Europe might be interested in a purely defensive domestic intelligence/surveillance space program. Iran has the motivation and the initiative, demonstrated by its planned March 2005 launch of its very first satellite. Additionally, Iran has a relatively capable missile program that will continue to improve, unless indigenous and exogenous factors interfere with Iranian military development. Their space program is still in its embryonic stages and not likely to be robust enough to challenge U.S. naval power even regionally.
The limiting factor for all these programs is not so much time as it is indigenous political willpower and economic capability. With the exception of Russia— should its reversal come sooner rather than later— none of the potential rivals has the necessary political willpower and economic leeway to complete a space-based defense program by 2015 that would be robust enough to challenge U.S. space hegemony.
Of course, geopolitical and military alliances between any of these rivals could accelerate indigenous programs and capabilities. It is worth noting that Russia has made a virtual cottage industry out of exporting its own space expertise and technology to countries such as India, China and Iran. Whenever Russia reverses course and begins to rebuild its military and space programs, this cooperation is likely to be somewhat curtailed, mitigating the benefits of these relationships.
Two important global dynamics during 2006 - will be the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relationships. The Russians signaled their intention to reverse American penetration -- and they very much regard it as American -- of their "near abroad," meaning the areas of the former Soviet Union which they regard as properly part of their sphere of influence. The United States, in the course of the war in Afghanistan, made substantial inroads in Central Asia, and in 2005, in spite of Iraq and the Islamist conflict, became involved -- from the Russian point of view -- in Ukraine. For Russia, this has generated a fundamental rethinking of its foreign policy. It has been asserting itself all along its periphery and rebuilding its military. 2006 will see an intensification of that process.
China will also become more assertive, but for different reasons. My view of the Chinese "economic miracle" is that it needs a miracle to sustain itself. China will always be a great economic power, but its severe economic imbalances will have equally severe consequences. This, in turn, will cause social unrest something I referred to on our recent webpage with research about China. We have seen Beijing respond by trying to use patriotism to hold together a fractious country. Virulent anti-Japanese campaigns, for example, were driven by domestic political considerations. We expect to see more unrest and more recourse to Chinese nationalism. We also expect China to look for levers to control U.S. pressure. China's ability to contain North Korea is such a lever. But it is a lever only if the North Koreans are threatening enough that China's good offices need to be used. We do not think that North Korea might use nuclear weapons, but this year, unlike in the past, North Korea has a great-power patron that might not be unhappy with a regional crisis.
Iran is a country that has also learned lessons from North Korea -- and from other great powers. Approaching the United States with a smile and handshake works, but not nearly as well as approaching it with a smile, handshake and a possible nuclear weapon. Iraq remains the Iranian obsession. Events are not going poorly for Iran there, but not nearly as well as Tehran had hoped. The United States appears to have created a dynamic that will prevent Iraq from becoming an Iranian satellite. The Iranians want to have leverage in Iraq and, in the worst case, want something with which to threaten the United States.
Iran understands that it will not be able to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon -- as opposed to a nuclear device too large or fragile to deploy -- without the United States or Israel taking it out. Israel does not want to carry out the strike. Indeed, no effective strike might be possible on Iranian weapons facilities except nuclear attack. Israel wants two things. First, that Iran stop at a line before it has a deployable weapon. Second, that if it does not do so, that the United States, or NATO, carry the burden. That may or may not happen, but one geopolitical constant must be taken seriously: Israel will not permit Iran to deploy nuclear weapons.
Iran knows this. It has three possible strategies. First, hope that Israeli or American intelligence misses the development of weapons until after they are deployed, giving Iran a deterrent. Second, hope for an Israeli attack in order to position themselves in the Islamic world as the real leader and victim of the anti-Zionist struggle. Third, carefully approach the line of deployability without crossing it.
I suspect that the third option is the Iranian strategy. The problem with the strategy is it assumes that the United States and Israel are both seeing the same thing as the Iranians, which assumes that they have not only excellent intelligence but trust its excellence. The United States will have trouble with that assumption, while the Israelis have so much at stake that they will have a much lower trigger point. In short, the possibilities of miscalculation in the Iranian situation are substantial. The unintended rather than the intended consequence is the most dangerous.
Thus Russia's desire to achieve a sphere of influence. China generating foreign-policy crises to restrain internal unrest. Iran using nuclear weapons development in a complex game of deterrence. Also a more traditional world is emerging, replete with nation-states, spheres of influence, strategic weapons and so on.
The war in Iraq is clearly not over. But it is also not defining the international system any longer. We expect Iraq to remain unstable and violent, but we expect a government to slowly emerge this year and in spite of endless crises, allow the United States to draw down its presence there. If al Qaeda -- in its 9-11 form -- is still out there, it hasn't shown itself in quite a while. This phase of history is not over, but it appears to have been sufficiently contained for other forces to rear their heads.
East Asia
The 2005 annual forecast says of Asia: "China -- and particularly its precarious economy -- will be Asia's geopolitical epicenter in 2005. Changing global trends will cause the Chinese economy to begin faltering. When the Chinese economy suffers, economic pains throughout Asia are sure to follow. Moreover, a faltering Chinese economy could cause the Communist Party to struggle to maintain control."
The year 2005 saw significant problems inside the Chinese economy, as the government revealed -- intentionally or otherwise -- the depths of inefficiencies, the growing rural-urban gap, the bad loan problems and, perhaps most troubling, the rising social backlash. Though China has managed the growing crises, it has not eliminated them. We overestimated the speed and degree of the Chinese meltdown, while underestimating Asians' ability to continue to pursue non-solutions and trick foreigners into believing all is well and good; but the general trend remains as we predicted.
China has postponed its debt crisis by spinning off bad debts to asset-management firms and giving foreign banks a vested interest in improving the viability of the major Chinese financial institutions. China has restated its gross domestic product (GDP) figures to make the country sixth-ranked in the world in terms of GDP -- and soon to be fourth. But growth does not equal health, particularly in a country where rapid growth remains necessary just to keep in place, and even the 9 percent growth rate is barely keeping up with the population's employment needs. China is running as fast as it can just to avoid slipping backward.
The fate of the Chinese economy, and the government's means and ability to maintain control, will remain front-and-center in 2006. China continues to struggle with massive bad debts racked up over years of running businesses for social stability rather than profit. In addition, several years of decentralization of economic priorities have compounded inefficiencies and redundancies even as China moves toward a market economy (albeit with Chinese characteristics). The social backlash to these local initiatives -- which have been tinged with corruption, if not thickly painted with it -- is now showing. Protests are growing larger and more violent -- with a recent clash in Shanwei, in southern Guangdong province, ending in local security forces opening fire at protesters.
In 2006, China will have to face this situation squarely. The government recognizes the problems; it just does not have a clear solution. The new five-year plan, set to be approved by the National People's Congress in March, sets as a goal the rectification of the rich-poor, urban-rural and geographical gaps. There is no clear plan for accomplishing this, but the government has let it be known that those who already have benefited from China's economic opening will be asked to "sacrifice" in order to bring up the rest of the country -- only "the rest" is some 900 million individuals.
The Chinese government has also sent another message, this one to those who are growing bolder in their protests. The government's reaction to the Shanwei incident sends a clear signal that social disturbances are about to be treated more seriously -- and deadly force could again be employed. At the same time, Beijing is not only attacking the demonstrators, it also is going after the corrupt local and regional officials and holding the bureaucracy responsible for social dissatisfaction. This is setting up a dangerous combination, but Beijing is betting that the threats will lead to another period of calm, instead of setting off the powder keg.
In an effort to keep things on track, Beijing will pump more money into central and western transportation infrastructure -- trying to bring the jobs to the people, rather than have the people move to where the jobs are. The government, in an attempt to slow the growth of inefficient and redundant industries -- including steel, copper and some construction sectors -- also is launching an initiative to "encourage" investments in certain industries while discouraging others. Finally, Beijing will continue to stir patriotism -- fanning nationalist sentiments against Japan while playing up the positive accomplishments of a China that instead of being isolated is now engaging, and being engaged by, major world powers.
Beijing will continue to seek an accommodating dialogue with the United States, staying just out of trouble and thus having a freer hand to deal with internal strife. In addition, the government will continue to pursue a path of providing economic rewards to opposition parties in Taiwan in order to further weaken the ruling pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. China will expand its energy cooperation with its neighbors, from former competitors in the South China Sea to ally North Korea to western neighbors India and Kazakhstan. And Beijing will continue to try to create a unifying sense of "Chineseness" through the space program, changes in global GDP ranking, anti-Japanese nationalism and preparations for the 2008 Olympics.
The rest of Asia will focus on what happens in China. Japan sees Beijing's continued rise as a threat -- and an opportunity to accelerate the reconstitution of Japan as a "normal" state, meaning one with a standing military no longer bound by a foreign-written pacifist constitution. Tokyo will continue to advance its own economic, political and security interests, re-emerging as a regional and even global player. This will bring it into confrontation with Beijing, and create a new battle between the two for friends and influence in East Asia and beyond.
The most visible aspect of this struggle will be in energy exploration in the East and South China Seas, where competing claims and shows of force could quickly lead to an accidental clash similar to the 2001 U.S.-Chinese EP-3 incident. Beijing and Tokyo also will clash over relations with Russia -- and access to Russian oil and gas resources. Though there will be some sense of cooperation in dealing with North Korea, each side will pursue its own national interest -- once again leaving Pyongyang free to maneuver and get the best deal.
This will all play out later in the year, when Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) chooses a new leader -- who will then become prime minister. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has pledged to step down on schedule, but has set in motion a system whereby the traditional factional politics of the LDP is being subsumed by the party's need for popular support -- and this will leave the popular Koizumi directing the future of Japan long after he steps aside as prime minister.
The China-Japan rivalry will shape another major regional trend: the continued attempts to create a regional bloc, or at least define what it means to be "Asian." The Association of Southeast Asian Nations sits at the center of the effort, but throughout East Asia there is a drive toward regional cooperation, from economic and security initiatives to political exchanges. At the same time, Asian arms spending and military deployments will increase, and nationalism will rise even amid the moves toward regionalism.
East Asia also will deal with a new phase of Islamist militancy, as the Philippines seeks a final accord with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) recovers from the loss of a key bombmaker, and Thailand continues to struggle with ongoing sectarian violence in the southern provinces. With the core of JI eliminated, the pattern of a single major strike once a year in Indonesia could fall by the wayside, and individual cells might start to carry out smaller but more frequent strikes in Indonesia, the Philippines and perhaps even Malaysia.
And, in the eternal saga of North Korea's nuclear program, the year's developments will depend as much as anything on how strong and secure U.S. President George W. Bush is, as Pyongyang eyes Washington's readiness for a potential compromise and the path toward normalized relations. But time may no longer be on Pyongyang's side. As the agricultural situation improves -- if ever so slightly -- and economic cooperation with Seoul increases, North Koreans could start to lose some of their siege mentality and begin to view their own leadership, not the imposition of blockades and sanctions by foreign powers, as the core of their problems.
From Russia with Realism
The first rule of Russian geopolitics is that a Russia without considerable strategic depth is an indefensible entity. Russia lacks any natural barriers to invasion and so its policy has always been to establish buffers between itself and potential aggressors. In the Russian mind, Ukraine is not merely an indivisible part of the Russian psyche or industrial and agricultural heartland -- it is the most important of these buffers.
The feelings harbored toward the Russians by the people who live in such buffer regions are obviously less than cordial, and this creates the second rule of Russian geopolitics: Russia must choose to expend its efforts on either security or economics; it cannot have both. In the period from 1985 to 2004, the Kremlin attempted to trade geopolitical space for economic benefits. With the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004, it became apparent that that strategy had failed.
And so in 2005 Russia began to push back wherever intrusions occurred, with wildly varying results. In Chechnya, Russia finally seems to have turned the tide of the insurgency by assassinating all of the nationalist leaders. That left the international jihadists more or less in charge, and changed the nature of the war to essentially a law-enforcement operation. In Uzbekistan, Russia successfully played on local fears of a "color revolution" to convince Tashkent to give U.S. forces the boot.
But elsewhere, Russian efforts came to naught. Ukraine and Georgia, while destabilized, remain outside the Russian orbit. Chinese and Muslim encroachment continues in the Russian Far East and south, respectively.
The reasons for the inconsistency in performance are simple. Antipathy to all things Russian runs very strong in the Russian borderlands -- and while powerful, Russia is hardly omnipotent. Just as important, Russia's competitors have a very clear idea of what their end goals are: China wants Siberia, the European Union wants Ukraine, the United States wants to remain the only global superpower. But Moscow lacks a countervision -- all it knows is that it does not like U.S. influence in its near abroad. And even acting to achieve that "goal" is circumscribed by the fact that President Vladimir Putin is loathe to sever his ties with the West or to trigger an outright confrontation.
Though Russia moved everywhere in 2005, it experienced only two true successes: containing the Chechen insurgency and ejecting U.S. forces from their Uzbek base. But bear in mind that 2005 was only the beginning of Russian resistance -- 2006 will witness a maturing and sharpening of the strategy.
The November elevation of Gazprom Chairman of the Board Dmitry Medvedev to first deputy prime minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to deputy prime minister marks the adoption of a much more coherent and clear-eyed Russian foreign policy. Part of the reason that Russia has slid so much since 1992 is that policy has been dominated either by delusional idealists who want to copy all things Western, or by equally delusional paranoids who are convinced the West is poised for mass invasion. The results were the disasters of shock therapy and anti-U.S. diplomacy that is the political equivalent of a shrill scream.
Under Medvedev
and Ivanov, Russian efforts will be far more pragmatic -- and therefore
more effective. The two will leverage Russia's many strengths in intelligent
ways instead of relying on rhetoric or myth. For example, irritating the
Western powers by assisting the Iranian nuclear program is useful to Moscow
only if Iran is not pushing for a crisis. In contrast, fomenting problems
for the fledgling pro-Western Ukrainian government serves Russia's interests
any day of the week. As such, Russia will make great strides in areas where
barriers to progress are weak and Russia's tools are powerful.
Russia is Western
Europe's largest -- and Central Europe's only -- supplier of natural gas.
Prices charged will skyrocket in 2006 as Russia establishes a new basis
for Moscow's relations with its western neighbors. In fact, state consolidation
of Russia's energy industry will turn from a trend to a tool used to effect
policy changes throughout Russia's periphery and beyond. As Ukraine discovered
Jan. 1, actual oil or natural gas cutoffs are realistic options. Even Western
Europe is not immune -- already Gazprom, the Russian state natural gas
monopoly, has dictated that its Western European customers must increase
their payments for 2006 by some 50 percent over 2005 levels.
The various
Central Asian governments have long justified their tyrannies by trumping
up the threat of international jihadists, but now they fear a far greater
threat in the form of "color revolutions." Russia will play on that fear
to project military power throughout the region. By addressing the issue
on a bilateral basis rather than under the auspices of the Commonwealth
of Independent States or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Moscow
can be sure to maximize both permanence and penetration. The goal is to
excise all meaningful U.S. military influence.
Several years
of strong energy revenues and sound financial decisions means that in 2006
Russia will finally be able to afford to purchase new weapons. Those new
systems will affect in no small way the means by which Russia influences
its neighbors, granting it both more effective carrots (for Central Asia
and Middle East) and sticks (for Ukraine and the Caucasus).
But in places
where opposition is strong, Russia's actions will be slow, methodical and
probing.
The former
Soviet republic of Georgia may be weak, but anti-Russian feeling is strong
and the country's economy is backed up not just by the Western alliance,
but also by energy supermajor BP -- also the largest foreign investor in
Russia. Moscow may want Georgia -- and the new oil pipeline running through
it to Turkey -- to fail, but it will need to manipulate events so that
Georgia falls apart on its own. It cannot afford a direct confrontation.
Ukraine is on a knife-edge. The Orange Revolution has stalled and 2005 saw the Russians help intensify the country's innate political chaos. 2006 will be the year that Russia subtly moves behind the scenes to position itself as the logical savior, with parliamentary elections being the key event. The trick will be to act quietly enough that the West does not weigh in as a heavy counterbalance.
Middle East and South Asia
The Middle East
and South Asia in 2005 continued to witness developments very much connected
to the U.S.-jihadist war that began with the Sept. 11 attacks. Key among
them were the following:
Iraq made progress
toward a political accommodation, and the insurgents proved unable to derail
the process.
Iran saw the
ultraconservatives rise to power over the more West-friendly reformists.
Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon consolidated his hold on power, and Hamas moved toward
becoming a political group -- trying to exploit its popular appeal to push
ahead with its agenda -- after seeing its military capabilities progressively
deteriorate under Israeli pressure.
The Saudi government,
with a new king at the helm, successfully contained al Qaeda jihadists
in the kingdom.
In Egypt's
parliamentary elections, brought about under U.S. pressure to democratize
the region, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement became the main opposition
force in the country.
While it staged
a number of significant operations in the United Kingdom, Egypt and Jordan,
al Qaeda continued to lose its strategic relevance.
Under pressure
from the United States to give up its influence in Lebanon, the Syrian
regime maintained its hold on power, avoiding the crisis generated by the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.
Pakistani President
Gen. Pervez Musharraf strengthened his grip on power and was able to make
gains against al Qaeda and move ahead with the process of normalizing relations
with India.
Afghanistan,
despite the surge in Taliban and al Qaeda activity, moved ahead with its
political process with the election of its first parliament since 1969.
The year 2006 will be one of political accommodations and negotiations. These talks -- which will involve emerging political forces (both state and non-state actors), incumbents and the United States -- will not translate into a state of peace, but will bring violence in the region more or less back to pre-Sept. 11 levels, where the intensity of the conflicts will no longer provoke geopolitical urgency of global proportions.
Violence will continue in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian theater, and jihadists will stage occasional attacks elsewhere in the region; but the political negotiations will be much more geopolitically significant than the militancy. The general trend will be toward political settlements of one kind or another.
The dust that was thrown up by the Sept. 11 attacks appears to be settling. Every state, in flux since Sept. 11 -- and each conflict, impacted by the Sept. 11 attacks and the U.S. response -- seems to be returning to business as usual. Actors at the domestic level are negotiating with each other, and to varying degrees the United States is involved in these talks. There also are talks at the international level. In essence, militant Islamism no longer poses a strategic threat to the region.
We will see this process of accommodation play out in the domestic politics of Iraq, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.
The new Iraqi government will act to stabilize the country, and there will be movement toward a significant reduction in U.S. and coalition forces toward the end of 2006. The year will see major violence as Baghdad seeks to go after the jihadists and the other rejectionist Sunni elements. There also will be intense political negotiations involving Shia, Sunnis and the Kurds on power-sharing matters, likely resulting in a coalition government. Given that the Sunnis will be included in this new full-term regime, the insurgency likely will decrease in intensity.
The crisis over
the Iranian nuclear program will ratchet up to dangerous levels of brinksmanship
with Israel and the United States.
Iran seeks
guarantees on Iraq and is playing the anti-Israeli card to pressure Washington
into obtaining those guarantees. The emergence of a regime in Baghdad dominated
by Tehran's allies among the Iraqi Shia, along with the negotiations over
the long-term presence of U.S. military forces in the Iraq, will coincide
with a deal on the nuclear issue. Iran is likely to achieve a deal that
allows the clerical regime to have enrichment capability but that, to satisfy
the Israelis, will prevent it from moving toward weaponization. This will
be achieved with Russian involvement at the technical and political levels.
Though the conflict will make its way to the United Nations Security Council,
no substantive punitive measures are likely to be taken against Iran --
the real issue is the back-channel talks between Washington and Tehran
over Iran's strategic position regarding Iraq.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's mentor, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi -- a leading cleric within the ultraconservative camp -- has a fair chance of making it into the Assembly of Experts when elections for the 86-member body take place. This organ of the regime is in charge of appointing the supreme leader of the radical Islamist Shiite republic, monitoring his performance and removing him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. This suggests that there will be a lot of negotiations between the ultraconservatives and the pragmatic conservatives, as neither group can enforce its own choice for supreme leader unilaterally.
Despite the blowback incurred from the assassination of al-Hariri, Syrian President Bashar al Assad will be able to keep his regime intact to reach the 2007 presidential elections. This will give him time to work out some form of accommodation with Washington whereby Damascus will maintain its presence in Lebanon in return for actively cooperating in containing the Iraqi insurgency at its borders. Fledgling militant Islamist movements in neighboring Lebanon likely will make their presence known in the Levant region through sporadic attacks, but will fail to spark sustainable insurgencies.
Should jihadists begin to use Lebanon as a launchpad for attacks against Israel, Israel can be expected to retaliate. Iran and Syria will use the opportunity to regain influence over Lebanon by offering to guarantee stability in the country, so long as Israel does not resort to a ground invasion. Lebanon will suffer from its usual degree of political instability as political jockeying will intensify to unseat lame-duck President Emile Lahoud. Lebanese-based militant group Hezbollah will likely manage to work out an arrangement with the ruling government to incorporate its militia into Lebanon's formal security apparatus and avoid pressure to disarm.
Al Qaeda, meanwhile, is becoming more of a brand name than an actual organization. So long as Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remain at large, they will serve as figureheads, providing moral support and broad strategic guidance to the fighters dispersed across the globe. But eventually al Qaeda will lose Iraq, with only affiliated local and regional cells, with attacks in select areas in North Africa, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. But a decentralization of the group out of Iraq, will not necessarily decrease the threat level in the West, especially in Europe.
Hamas will emerge as a major player on the Palestinian political scene and will lead to major internal upheaval within the Palestinian territories, as the ruling Fatah will adjust to the challenge from Hamas and try to deal with internal rifts. Hamas will soften its militant stanceand take care to choose government slots primarily in the security apparatus, avoiding positions that would require direct contact with Israel. Hamas will struggle with retaining its legitimacy as a militant resistance movement in light of its newly acquired political prowess, and will attempt to co-opt its militants into the Palestinian security apparatus to bypass pressure to disarm. Another approach that Hamas could take is formalizing a split in the organization to include a political and militant wing.
Hamas also will follow through with its plans to revive attacks against Israel if it feels its political interests are threatened. If, however, Hamas gains a major share in the Palestinian National Authority, it will likely gain a degree of control over Palestinian security forces. Given that it is the largest militant group with influence over other militant factions, this could lead to a more stable internal security situation. However, that development could lead to an increase in clashes between Israeli and Palestinian security forces on the borders of the Palestinian proto-state.
Flare-ups in the West Bank or along the Israel-Gaza border, however, will meet an aggressive Israeli response, especially as Israel has been injected with a heavy dose of instability with Sharon's untimely health complications.
Sharon's incapacitation will leave the Israeli political system in a major flux this coming year as the country currently lacks another charismatic leader with the ability to drive a centrist agenda. Sharon's new Kadima party likely will survive through the March elections, although it will not succeed in securing the same degree of support that it would under Sharon. The March elections will likely result in a center-left coalition with acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the helm. Sharon's policy of disengagement from select areas in the West Bank will not be able to make significant headway in the coming year, which will raise the possibility of a revival in the Palestinian militant scene.
In South Asia, the process toward normalizing relations between New Delhi and Islamabad will move forward, but no major breakthrough should be expected this year -- India will want to wait and see what happens in the 2007 Pakistani general elections before deciding how far it is willing to go.
In Pakistan, Musharraf will begin making major decisions toward the end of 2006 with regard to his dual portfolio as president and military chief. Constitutionally, he cannot hold both positions, and he has managed to do so only by casting it as a temporary necessity. With general elections coming in 2007, this will be the year in which Musharraf will have to figure out another arrangement. Opposition parties also will galvanize themselves, and the leadership of the two mainstream parties -- the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians -- will return. Meanwhile, Musharraf faces three major nationalist tribal leaders waging an insurgency in the Baluchistan province, which Islamabad will try to handle with a mix of military actions and negotiations.
Thus there is a possibility that increasing litany of tribulations will gradually move Musharraf into a corner. If control comes too late for Musharraf, he could be forced to either engage in extra-constitutional steps or cut a "new deal" with the opposition. In either case, instability is hard-wired into Pakistan's political system -- a democracy "guided" by the man with most guns in the country.
In India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government will pursue its objective of expanding New Delhi's global influence through arms deals, economic pacts and alliances. This is possible now that India's relations with its traditionally hostile neighbors, Pakistan and China, have significantly improved. However, many factors will impede India's expansionist policy.
Energy will top India's agenda -- New Delhi will attempt to cooperate with Beijing to avoid ending up on the losing side of oil and gas bidding wars. In addition, the government still does not have control over the insurgencies in the northeastern states, and the militancies in neighboring Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh remain significant.
Economic growth in India is still limited to certain sectors -- the agricultural sector continues to suffer, and infrastructural and bureaucratic problems still exist. As socio-economic conditions do not show signs of improving in the coming year, the leftists will develop a stronger presence in the government, which will only hamper Singh's policymaking abilities and his plans to bolster India's engagement with the United States.
Europe
Merkel undoubtedly will follow her predecessors' efforts to unite and federalize Europe -- but bearing in mind what is good for Germany, as opposed to what is good for Europe.
But even when the European leadership aggressively worked to further such federalist goals, Europe's centrifugal geopolitical tendencies led to the Dutch and French rejections of the EU constitution. Under Merkel it will be no different. The EU constitution and most other major integrationist efforts will lie dead throughout 2006 despite German attempts to raise them.
The grand politik
aside, more tactical matters will also ensure that Germany enjoys the center
stage.
After a generation
at the helm of France, President Jacques Chirac is a spent political force.
The only news of note in France in 2006 will be the rising battle between
his allies -- past ally Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy and present
ally Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin -- for the 2007 presidential
elections.
In the United
Kingdom, 2006 likely will see a transfer of power from Prime Minister Tony
Blair to Gordon Brown (currently chancellor of the exchequer). The necessary
period of consolidation will all but guarantee a lower stature for London
on the European stage.
Italy will
hold elections. Regardless of how the controversial Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi fares, whatever government takes office (or remains there) will
not hold. In order to increase its electoral chances, the Berlusconi government
has moved back to Italy's old proportional-representation system -- the
one responsible for producing, on average, a new government every 11 months
since 1950.
Which leaves
Merkel's Germany -- regardless of its position as the Continent's geographic
center and the union's largest economy -- as the only horse in the race.
This hardly
means the Europeans will fall diligently in line behind the new German
leader. The European experiment is ultimately an exercise in seeing how
much sovereignty states are willing to cede to an organization they cannot
control. The fact that Berlin will be speaking the loudest within such
an organization is likely to make the union's smaller members less confident
in the European Union's future -- not more.
Furthermore,
Russia's reassertion of its national interest cannot help but cause friction
along the European Union's eastern border -- the Central European states,
in particular Poland, Romania and the Baltic trio, are if anything more
terrified than ever of Russia. This will guarantee that the United States
will remain engaged to the detriment of any pan-European restoration.
Latin America
As we predicted in 2005, much of Latin America has reached a high point of social discontent, punctuated by rising social pressure regarding growth and wealth-distribution that placed Latin American leaders in a difficult political position. The past year saw the culmination of social and political change that will affect the region for the foreseeable future.
The region is in the midst of an 18-month election cycle and will see a political shift during 2006. Candidates from all ideological backgrounds will distance themselves from the United States, in part because of the growing disdain for U.S. policies in Latin America and throughout the world. The rise in anti-free trade and anti-U.S. sentiment that came to the forefront of political and social sectors during 2005 will cause a swing further to the political left as the election season continues. Candidates in Peru, Ecuador and Nicaragua will compete to be seen as the most anti-American, in order to gain votes. Some nominees, such as Bolivian President-elect Evo Morales and Peruvian presidential candidate Ollanta Humala, look to Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as examples for Latin America to follow.
The leftward shift will increase the strength and influence of socialist and populist movements -- but right-wing groups should not be disregarded. In 2006, the region's newly elected left-wing leaders will try to pursue an ideological path -- but they also must address the realities of the economic sphere. As a result, the region's emerging leaders will fall into two categories -- moderate socialists similar to Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, and populist revolutionaries like Chavez.
Brazil personifies the moderate socialist path. Da Silva entered the presidency as a center-left candidate, but inched toward the economic right after taking office. He faces a tough political future during 2006. Corruption charges that arose in 2005 against his Workers' Party (PT) continue to plague da Silva's presidency. The charges, combined with an emerging economic downturn, have affected public opinion and will impact the July presidential election. Da Silva has pledged not to change the country's economic model, in order to keep investors happy, but in the lead-up to the presidential election he will likely increase some social programs in order to placate the traditional left-wing constituency of the PT. Political concerns and outcomes aside, Brazil will remain on neoliberal economic and centrist political paths during 2006.
In Venezuela, Chavez will continue advancing his Bolivarian Revolution throughout the hemisphere, using energy interdependence and ideology to influence regional counterparts like da Silva, Morales and Argentine President Nestor Kirchner. Chavez's success in the December 2006 presidential election is almost certain. Opposition groups, who boycotted the December 2005 legislative elections, will attempt to regain some of their standing and legitimacy by playing up the fact that voter turnout was low; but 2006 will largely be a period in which Venezuela is run by Chavez for Chavez, with little interference.
Chavez will also continue his antagonism toward the United States and foreign companies. Caracas negotiated deals in 2005 with 32 oil companies, pressuring them to enter into joint ventures with state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA. As of this publication, 31 companies have signed. A larger push to consolidate foreign company assets under Caracas' control throughout 2006 can be expected as Chavez follows through on threats to expropriate land and collect back taxes from foreign firms.
Bolivia will continue down a left-wing path during 2006 and distance itself from the United States. However, Morales will go through a learning period in the first half of 2006 as he balances the needs of his Movement Toward Socialism party (and those of the poor and indigenous groups that are his core constituency) with the economic pragmatism required to appease elite factions that control the purse strings. Morales will skate a fine line between upholding a populist revolution and reviving the economy through market processes.
Argentina appears likely to maintain its current socialist path in 2006. Kirchner will further consolidate his friendship with Chavez and look to Caracas to support Argentina's economy through bond sales and energy shipments. The success of Kirchner's Justicialist Party in October elections gave the president a political mandate. As a result, Kirchner will broaden the scope of his socialist economic and social policies throughout 2006. Kirchner, however, may face pressure from Bolivia over natural gas prices and exports as Morales feels his way around Bolivia's foundering economy, forcing the brokering of a natural gas deal with La Paz to keep the lights on in Buenos Aires.
Mexico will hold presidential elections in July -- but regardless of the outcome, the country is likely to remain on a relatively neoliberal economic course. Although former Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is a left-wing candidate, like da Silva he understands his country's dependence on the United States. Though he has vowed to increase social welfare programs should he win, he is unlikely to radically alter the economic system. Since Lopez Obrador is further to the ideological left than the other two candidates, Felipe Calderon and Roberto Madrazo, it is unlikely that Mexico will swing to an economic extreme no matter who wins in July 2006.
Colombia also will remain on a neoliberal economic course during 2006. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez likely will win the May presidential election. He will maintain close ties with Washington, but will remain wary of angering Chavez. Uribe's primary focus during the election campaign will be demilitarizing guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The National Liberation Army appears on track to disarm completely during 2006, while the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia will demobilize sufficiently to satisfy Uribe, but will not completely disarm. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has the means and motivation to increase attacks during the election season in an effort to undermine Uribe's re-election bid. Therefore, an uptick in violence from FARC can be expected in the first five months of 2006 as the guerrillas entrench their hold on areas where they already have support, over government resistance.
Chile, as usual, remains the exception to the Latin American rule. The left-wing Concertacion party focuses on free-market polices as the key to economic prosperity. Chile will expand its search for economic allies outside of Latin America, looking increasingly toward Asia, specifically China and India, for trade partners. Chile's elections on Jan. 15 pitted the leading Concertacion candidate Michelle Bachelet against billionaire and center-right candidate Sebastian Pinera. Though Bachelet won, it is our expectation that, as in Mexico and Brazil, Chile's economic course would remain unchanged regardless of the election outcome.
The wildcard affecting the region's ideological balance in 2006 is the outcome of Peru's presidential elections in April. Heading into 2006, socialist and former lieutenant colonel Humala began gaining in the polls against the conservative frontrunner Lourdes Flores. The emergence of former President Alberto Fujimori from exile in Japan has added a new dimension to the election by further complicating an already complex presidential race, drawing attention away from many candidates. Should Flores win, Peru will have to address the social discontent people feel toward current President Alejandro Toledo's policies. Should Humala win, Lima will look to Caracas and La Paz for support, affecting the political and social trajectory of Peru and the region. However, regional ideological pressure will not force countries like Colombia to significantly alter relations with the United States.
Sub-Saharan Africa
The United States and European Union will be too preoccupied with other issues to significantly interfere in African political affairs in 2006. This will open the door for more secondary powers to make inroads on the continent. Most notably, China will significantly expand its ties in Sudan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other countries, hoping to increase its current and future access to resources on the continent. India and Malaysia will make similar efforts. The availability of natural resources -- oil, gas, cotton and a variety of minerals -- will make Africa attractive for the fastest-emerging world economic players, though it is not immediately as attractive to the major political players.
Among African countries, it is Sudan -- with its plans to double oil output to 1 million barrels per day by the end of 2006 -- that will emerge as the most dynamic economic player. Progress in Khartoum will be seen in an attempted peace deal with the Darfur rebels, the normalization of relations with countries in the Horn of Africa, and attempts to attract more business into the country, while further implementing the January 2005 peace agreement with the former rebels in the south. In the DRC, elections scheduled for April and June will establish a permanent legal authority in the country. Leading up to the elections, both Kinshasa and the international community will make efforts to quell insurgent elements in Katanga in order to capitalize on the speculation that the possibility of political stability in the country will bring vast new opportunities for resource wealth, including speculation on oil. The trend also will appear in southern African countries, because of their cotton and agricultural resources, as well as in west African countries, where the current period of relative stability will lead to increased agricultural outputs, most notably cocoa.
While the United States will not attempt to prevent secondary powers from expanding their influence on the continent, Washington will continue engaging these countries politically -- at least enough to maintain a place at the table. Additionally, the United States will engage several African countries on security matters in order to prevent the spread of terrorism and jihadist ideology, seen most often in the Horn of Africa and West Africa.
The lack of pressure and direct interference from Washington and the European Union will lead to a devolution of the levels of democracy currently seen in Africa. As African countries begin to realize that India, China, Malaysia, Iran and others do not care if they play by a democratic gamebook, the benefits they currently receive from the United States and Europe will become less appealing. The trend will be especially pronounced in countries that will become nearly or completely debt-free in 2006, including Uganda, Ethiopia, Senegal, Zambia, Mali and Ghana.
Meanwhile, the major powers on the continent will be largely preoccupied with political crises of their own. South Africa will face political turmoil because of problems within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) that will seriously threaten the party's internal political succession in 2007 -- raising concerns that internal divisions might cause the ANC to splinter, and calling into question the prospect of a peaceful succession of the country's presidency in 2009. These problems will peak in 2006 during ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma's trials on charges of rape and corruption, while all sides of the tripartite alliance use the March 1 local elections to gauge their standing within the coalition ahead of the 2007 battle.
Nigeria also will experience political problems because of President Olusegun Obasanjo's desire to seek a third term in 2007. Obasanjo is limited to serving two terms under the constitution, and faces dissent both within the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and among domestic opposition parties over his push to pass the necessary constitutional changes before PDP primaries are held late in the year.
As these problems hurt the credibility of African leaders at home and in the international community, the established African powerbrokers who typically work with African institutions, the United Nations, the United States and the European Union during major African crises will not be able to effectively function. A new tier of "elder statesmen" African leaders will emerge to deal with budding problems on the continent, while other formerly influential leaders attempt to help fill the void, including Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano.
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